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Abstract: 
    
Three types of theories have been used to explain the wage premium in foreign firms: the 
heterogeneous-workers theory, the heterogeneous-learning theory, and the heterogeneous-
firms theory. We set up a model that explicitly encompasses two of these, and which can 
illustrate the third. This unifying framework allows us to rigorously compare the predictions 
of the different theories and thus provides a workhorse for interpreting new and existing 
empirical evidence. We illustrate the usefulness of the model on matched employer-employee 
data and find considerable support for all three theories. In particular, the heterogeneous-
workers theory can explain up to 75% of the premium. 
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I. Introduction 
A number of papers have documented that foreign and/or multinational firms (MNEs) 
pay higher wages (see, e.g., Aitken et al., 1996; Lipsey, 2004; Bernard et al., 2009), and, to 
the best of our knowledge, no study has found the opposite. Several possible explanations for 
this wage premium can be found in the literature, but the implications of the underlying 
theories have not been rigorously spelled out and contrasted, and empirical analyses are often 
not based on hypotheses derived explicitly from these theories. An interesting question is, of 
course, whether the observed wage differences reflect productivity differences of workers 
and/or firms. With this in mind, the existing explanations can be grouped into three types, 
reflecting the different assumptions of the underlying theories.1 
According to the first type of explanation, the observed premium reflects a pure 
selection phenomenon. Foreign firms simply employ ex-ante better workers in terms of 
observable and/or unobservable characteristics. The reason behind this could be a 
complementarity between technology (or capital) and worker skills (Yeaple, 2005; Ekholm 
and Midelfart, 2005), between skilled managers and skilled workers (Manasse and Turrini, 
2001), or among skilled workers themselves. We refer to this set of explanations as the 
heterogeneous-workers (HW) theory.  
The second type of explanation instead argues that the premium is a pure learning 
phenomenon. The underlying theory is that workers become more productive in foreign firms 
through better training (Görg et al., 2007), through more useful experience, or by picking up 
valuable ideas (Fosfuri et al., 2001; Ethier and Markusen, 1996; Markusen, 2001; Glass and 
Saggi, 2002). Hence, this group of explanations relies on different learning opportunities in 
																																																								
1 In a parallel literature on the wage premium in large firms, Troske (1999) lists seven main explanations, which 
he subsequently tests on US data. As we shall argue below, these explanations are closely related to those of the 
wage premium in foreign firms. 
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foreign vs. domestic firms, and we therefore refer to it as the heterogeneous-learning (HL) 
theory.  
The third type of explanation also relies on heterogeneous firms – but not in terms of 
learning opportunities. Instead, the premium is believed to reflect common characteristics of 
foreign firms that influence the firm-specific wage setting. It could either be a compensation 
for different working conditions in foreign firms (Fabbri et al., 2003; Bernard and Sjoholm, 
2003; and Lipsey, 2004) or reflect rent sharing under imperfect labor markets. We refer to this 
set of explanations as the (static) heterogeneous-firms (HF) theory. 
Only the first two theories involve workers who are actually more productive in foreign 
firms, and only according to the second theory do foreign firms improve the productivity of 
the domestic workers. 2  The HF theory, on the other hand, implies that rents may be 
transferred from foreign firms to domestic workers. Hence, from a host-country perspective, 
knowing the relevance and relative importance of the different theories is important input for 
policy makers deciding on, e.g., the conditions for foreign direct investments. We shall return 
to a discussion of this issue later in the paper. 
We first set up a relatively simple model that encompasses both the HW and the HL 
theories. It is the first model to incorporate both theories into a simple and tractable model 
that allows each of the theories to emerge as special cases. The model shows how both 
theories can give rise to a wage premium in foreign firms in a competitive labor-market 
setting. We also explain less rigorously how the model can be extended to nest the HF theory. 
This is the first contribution of the paper. 
The model provides a unifying framework that allows us to spell out and rigorously 
compare the predictions and implications of the HW, HL and HF theories. This has not been 
																																																								
2 Foreign firms can, of course, also benefit host economies through other channels. Thus, there is a large 
literature focusing on firm-to-firm and firm-to-market spillovers; see Lipsey (2004) for a review. 
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done systematically before. The model thus provides a workhorse for interpreting existing and 
new empirical evidence in light of the existing theories. This constitutes the second 
contribution of the paper. 
Finally, we illustrate the usefulness of the model by testing the theoretical predictions 
on a huge matched employer-employee data set from Denmark to see if we can find evidence 
of and even assess the relative importance of the different theories for wage determination in 
foreign firms. This is the third contribution of the paper. 
To preview our results, we find that the HW theory can explain up to 75% of the 
observed foreign-firm wage premium within an industry-area group, while the remainder is 
consistent with the HL and HF theories. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
provide such an estimate. We also find considerable evidence of the importance of the HF and 
HL theories. One finding that supports the HL theory is that wage growth is found to be 
(considerably) higher in foreign firms – also when controlling for observed and unobserved 
worker heterogeneity. Another finding supporting the HL theory is that experience from 
foreign firms is more valuable than experience from domestic firms and, furthermore, that 
foreign-firm experience acquired in previous employments is (at least) as important as 
foreign-firm experience acquired in the current employment. Finally, we also find explicit 
support for the HF theory, as starting wages in foreign firms are found to be higher than in 
domestic firms even when controlling for observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section II, we review the existing 
theories more carefully, present our theory model and derive its implications. Section III 
describes the data, while section IV presents the empirical results. Section V concludes. 
II. Theory 
 In this section, we first review existing theories of the wage premium – and wage 
setting more generally – in foreign firms. We then set up the basic version of our theory 
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model and discuss possible extensions. Finally, we outline and compare the empirical 
implications of the HW, HL, and HF theories. 
Existing literature 
As mentioned in the introduction, several arguments have been used in the literature to 
explain the higher wages in foreign firms. Our grouping of these explanations into three 
general theories about the wage setting in foreign firms is based on the involved assumptions 
about worker and firm productivity differences. 
First, the heterogeneous-workers (HW) theory has been developed carefully in the case 
of exporting firms by Yeaple (2005), Ekholm and Midelfart (2005) and Manasse and Turrini 
(2001). In Yeaple (2005) and Ekholm and Midelfart (2005), workers differ exogenously in 
skills and ex-ante homogeneous firms endogenously choose between a more scale-intensive 
and a less scale-intensive technology. As skilled workers have a comparative advantage in the 
scale-intensive technology, the firms that choose this technology will employ more skilled 
workers, be larger, engage in international trade, and pay higher wages. Manasse and Turrini 
(2001) develop a model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, where the most able of these (the 
“superstars”) operate on a larger scale, engage in trade, employ workers of higher skills, and 
as a consequence pay higher wages on average. In the model below, we allow workers to 
differ exogenously in skills and firms to choose endogenously between two technologies as in 
Yeaple (2005) and Ekholm and Midelfart (2005). 
Second, the heterogeneous-learning (HL) theory builds on Rosen’s (1972) idea of on-
the-job learning and has been formalized in set-ups with foreign-owned firms by Ethier and 
Markusen (1996), Markusen (2001), Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002). In 
these papers, learning is exogenous in the sense that it is not an endogenous “training” 
decision by the firms. Glass and Saggi (2002) thus build an oligopoly model where workers 
employed by the foreign firm immediately get access to its superior technology. Hence, it 
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must pay a wage premium to prevent workers from immediately switching to other companies 
bringing along information about this technology. In Fosfuri et al. (2001), Ethier and 
Markusen (1996), and Markusen (2001), on the other hand, workers only learn about the 
superior technology after one period of employment; see also Pakes and Nitzan (1983). Hence, 
workers are not immediately paid a higher wage in foreign firms, but only over time. In all 
three papers, productivity transfers may arise when workers employed by foreign firms move 
to domestic firms. Recently, Gorg et al. (2007) have used a two-period bargaining 
framework to argue that if training is more productive and specific in foreign firms, workers 
in these firms will have a steeper wage profile and therefore acquire a wage premium over 
time.3 
Finally, the heterogeneous-firms (HF) theory does not rely on workers in foreign firms 
to either be or become more productive. Instead, firm characteristics are allowed to affect the 
firm-specific wage setting. Hence, the premium could be a compensation for higher labor 
demand volatility in foreign firms (Fabbri et al., 2003), a higher closure rate of foreign firms 
(Bernard and Sjoholm, 2003), or due to preferences by workers for domestic firms (Lipsey, 
2004). These explanations are all consistent with competitive labor markets. Alternatively, 
allowing for imperfect labor markets, the wage premium may reflect rent sharing between 
foreign firms and their workers through bargaining or efficiency wages (Budd et al., 2005). If 
supervision is more expensive in foreign firms due to cultural differences or size, these firms 
could rely more extensively on efficiency wages to avoid shirking or to induce optimal effort. 
Alternatively, upward-sloping labor supply curves for the individual firm (monopsony) could 
result in larger firms (including foreign firms) paying higher wages. Hence, both in the rent-
																																																								
3 Elements of both the heterogeneous-workers theory and the heterogeneous-firms theory are found in the paper 
of Markusen and Trofimenko (2009). In this paper, ex-ante identical firms can choose to employ foreign experts 
and ex-ante identical workers learn from these experts. 
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sharing and in the compensating-differential cases, the implication of the HF theory is that 
wages of similar workers are higher in foreign-owned firms.  
In sum, the HW and HL theories rely on ex-ante and ex-post worker productivity 
differences, respectively, while the HF theory assumes identical workers throughout. 
The theories presented above relate closely to those of the older and more extensive 
literature on firm size and wages. Troske (1999) thus lists and tests seven main explanations 
for the wage premium in large firms. The first four explanations are all examples of the HW 
theory relying on different complementarities between skilled workers and characteristics of 
the large firms; see also Oi (1983), Kremer (1993), Dunne and Schmitz (1995), and Fox 
(2009). The last three explanations in Troske (1999) are examples of the HF theory relying on 
bargaining and efficiency wages; see also Brown and Medoff (2003). While Troske (1999) 
does not explicitly consider the HL theory, it is mentioned in the handbook chapter by Oi and 
Idson (1999) on the same issue. 
As we shall see, our model also predicts a close relationship between size and 
ownership. Hence, a distinct contribution of this paper is to highlight the close connection 
between the two strands of literature, although separate effects of ownership can also be 
expected. 
The basic model 
This paper is the first to incorporate the HW and HL theories into one simple and 
tractable model. Hence, we allow for both ex-ante heterogeneous workers and firms. We 
allow workers to differ exogenously in skills and firms to choose endogenously between two 
technologies as in Yeaple (2005). This is cast in a set-up with on-the-job learning possibilities 
as in Markusen (2001) and with potentially heterogeneous firms engaging in monopolistic 
competition as in Melitz (2003), where firms now differ with respect to learning opportunities.  
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The model has a quasi-dynamic OLG structure where workers live for two periods, but 
firms are long-lived. There are no saving/investment decisions and demand is stationary. 
Hence, it is sufficient to analyze a single period. The model is of a partial-equilibrium nature. 
In particular, consumption expenditure is fixed, and there is an unlimited supply of workers 
available at a given wage. 
Domestic consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over an endogenous number, K, of 
differentiated goods and spend an exogenous amount of income, I, on these goods. Each 
period’s demand does not depend on prices in the other period. Hence, demand for any good, 
i, is given by: 
௜ܺ ൌ ݌௜ି ఙሾ∑ ݌௞ଵିఙ௄௞ୀଵ ሿିଵܫ        (1) 
where ߪ denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Domestic (D) and Foreign (F) 
firms each produce one variety, and hence K is determined by the number of firms serving the 
domestic market in equilibrium. 
Following Yeaple (2005), we assume that there are two types of technologies available 
to domestic and foreign firms: An Advanced technology (A), which is skill-intensive and 
offers opportunities for learning, and a Basic technology (B), with firms using these 
technologies referred to as type-A and type-B firms, respectively. There is free entry of 
domestic and foreign firms into both types of technologies, but the use of a technology is 
associated with fixed costs per period, which are higher for foreign firms, reflecting the higher 
costs of entry into the domestic market for foreign firms as in Helpman et al. (2004).  
Specifically, we assume that the fixed costs for the type-B technology are the same for 
all potential domestic firms, ܨܥௗ௕, and lower than the fixed costs for all potential foreign firms, 
ܨܥௗ௕ ൏ ܨܥ௙௕. As a consequence, no foreign firms using the type-B technology will enter in 
equilibrium. In line with Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004), we assume that there is a 
distribution of fixed costs across potential firms for their use of the type-A technology with 
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foreign firms facing proportionately higher costs. To capture this in a tractable way, we 
assume that if ݊ௗ௔ domestic and ݊௙௔ foreign type-A firms enter in equilibrium, the fixed costs 
of the marginal (highest cost) firms are given by ݊ௗ௔ܨܥௗ௔ for domestic firms and by ݊௙௔ܨܥ௙௔ for 
foreign firms, where ܨܥௗ௔ ൏ ܨܥ௙௔. An added benefit of this formulation is that it allows for an 
alternative interpretation in which firms are ex-ante homogeneous (as in Yeaple, 2005) and 
the fixed costs of using the type-A technology are therefore identical for all potential domestic 
(or foreign) firms, but are increasing in the total number of firms choosing the technology, 
e.g., due to shortages of skilled workers in the labor market.4 Under the former interpretation, 
all type-A firms except the marginal ones will earn rents in equilibrium, while in the latter 
case, all type-A firms are pushed down to zero profits. While labor is the only variable input 
for firms, we assume that fixed costs are “purchased” and not part of a firm’s labor demand.  
All workers within a firm produce the same variety of output, but workers may differ in 
productivity. There are two types of workers ex-ante: Skilled (S) and High-skilled (H), each 
having a two-period career. The productivity of a worker depends on her ex-ante type, the 
technology of the firm, and – in period 2 – her experience from period 1. In the basic version 
of the model, we assume that workers do not switch firm type after period 1, but that skills 
can be perfectly transferred within firm types. 
If an S-worker joins a type-B firm, she does not improve her productivity over time, and 
we normalize it to one in both periods: ݎݏଵ௕ ൌ ݎݏଶ௕ ൌ ݎݏ௕ ൌ 1 , where ݎݏଵ௕  denotes the 
productivity of an S-worker in a type-B firm in period 1, etc. If she instead joins a type-A 
firm, she has at least as high a productivity in her first period as those who join type-B firms, 
and learning may result in an even higher productivity in the second period of her career: 
																																																								
4 In this case, it may be more reasonable to assume that fixed costs of all type-A firms (domestic or foreign) are 
identical and given by ൫݊௙௔ ൅ ݊ௗ௔൯ܨܥ௔, in which case only the total number of type-A firms in equilibrium can be 
determined, while their distribution on foreign and domestic firms is indeterminate. 
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1 ൑ ݎݏଵ௔ ൑ ݎݏଶ௔ . H-workers have the same productivity as S-workers in type-B firms, 
ݎ݄ଵ௕ ൌ ݎ݄ଶ௕ ൌ 1, but have an absolute advantage when working with the type-A technology:  
ݎݏଵ௔ ൑ ݎ݄ଵ௔ and ݎݏଶ௔ ൑ ݎ݄ଶ௔. This is similar to Yeaple (2005). While there is a limited supply 
of H-workers, which for simplicity we assume is not sufficient to meet the demand from type-
A firms, there is a sufficient supply of potential S-workers available at a fixed wage (= 1) to 
meet the demand from all firms. These assumptions imply that all H-workers are always 
employed by type-A firms and that the wage for S-workers in type-B firms is one in both 
periods: ݓݏଵ௕ ൌ ݓݏଶ௕ ൌ ݓݏ௕ ൌ 1. 
Under the so-called “large-group” assumption, individual firms are assumed to be too 
small to influence the price-index term in the square brackets in (1). Hence, output prices are 
determined as a constant mark-up on the marginal costs. As output is produced by five 
“different” types of labor, there are five first-order conditions for output in our model: Four 
for a type-A firm (output produced by S- and H-workers in each period of their two-period 
career), and one for a type-B firm (output produced by S-workers). To allow for corner 
solutions, we adopt a complementarity representation of our model in which all equations are 
written as weak inequalities each with an associated non-negative complementary variable:  
݌௔ሺ1 െ 1 ߪ⁄ ሻݎݏଵ௔ ൑ ݓݏଵ௔																																ܺܵଵ௔     (2) 
݌௔ሺ1 െ 1 ߪ⁄ ሻݎݏଶ௔ ൑ ݓݏଶ௔																																ܺܵଶ௔     (3) 
݌௔ሺ1 െ 1 ߪ⁄ ሻݎ݄ଵ௔ ൑ ݓ݄ଵ௔																																ܺܪଵ௔    (4) 
݌௔ሺ1 െ 1 ߪ⁄ ሻݎ݄ଶ௔ ൑ ݓ݄ଶ௔																																ܺܪଶ௔    (5) 
݌௕ሺ1 െ 1 ߪ⁄ ሻݎݏ௕ ൑ ݓݏ௕ ൌ 1																								ܺ௕     (6) 
݌௔ and ݌௕ are the prices of the representative good produced by a type-A and a type-B firm, 
respectively. ݓݏଵ௔ is the wage of an S-worker in a type-A firm in the first period of her career, 
and ܺ ଵܵ௔ is the output produced by S-workers in a representative type-A firm, etc. Hence, 
equation (2) says that in equilibrium, the marginal revenue product of a young S-worker in a 
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type-A firm should be less than or equal to her wage. If it is strictly less, the complementary 
variable, ܺ ଵܵ௔ , must be zero, i.e., no young S-workers are employed by type-A firms in 
equilibrium. Similar interpretations apply to the other four equations. 
 Total production by a representative type-A firm is then given by: ܺ௔ ൌ ܺ ଵܵ௔ ൅ ܺܵଶ௔ ൅
ܺܪଵ௔ ൅ ܺܪଶ௔ . Note that domestic and foreign type-A firms will have the same amount of 
output, as they face the same demand and marginal costs. There will just be fewer foreign 
type-A firms in equilibrium due to their higher fixed costs. The free-entry conditions for 
domestic and foreign type-A firms and domestic type-B firms are then given by: 
ሺ݌௔ ߪ⁄ ሻܺ௔ ൑ ݊ௗ௔ܨܥௗ௔																																								݊ௗ௔     (7) 
ሺ݌௔ ߪ⁄ ሻܺ௔ ൑ ݊௙௔ܨܥ௙௔																																								݊௙௔     (8) 
ሺ݌௕ ߪ⁄ ሻܺ௕ ൑ ܨܥ௕																																													݊௕     (9) 
Equation (7) says that revenue less variable costs (the left-hand side) for domestic type-A 
firms should be less than or equal to the fixed costs of the marginal domestic type-A firm (the 
right-hand side). If strictly less, it is because no domestic type-A firms enter in equilibrium. 
Similarly for equations (8) and (9). 
 Because of symmetry within firm types, there are just two equations for goods-market 
clearing, where the complementary variables are the prices: 
ܺ௔ ൒ ሺ݌௔ሻିఙൣ൫݊ௗ௔ ൅ ݊௙௔൯ሺ݌௔ሻଵିఙ ൅ ݊௕ሺ݌௕ሻଵିఙ൧ିଵܫ												݌௔  (10) 
ܺ௕ ൒ ሺ݌௕ሻିఙൣ൫݊ௗ௔ ൅ ݊௙௔൯ሺ݌௔ሻଵିఙ ൅ ݊௕ሺ݌௕ሻଵିఙ൧ିଵܫ												݌௕  (11) 
where the right-hand sides in (10) and (11) are the demands for a representative good at the 
prices ݌௔ and ݌௕, respectively. 
Finally, there are four conditions, (12)-(15), for labor-market clearing. First, there is an 
exogenous supply, SH, of H-workers of each vintage, which must equal the demand for H-
workers by type-A firms (with wages being the complementary variables). This results in the 
first two conditions: 
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ܵܪ ൒ ൫݊ௗ௔ ൅ ݊௙௔൯ܺܪଵ௔/ݎ݄ଵ௔																																	ݓ݄ଵ௔    (12) 
ܵܪ ൒ ൫݊ௗ௔ ൅ ݊௙௔൯ܺܪଶ௔/ݎ݄ଶ௔																																	ݓ݄ଶ௔    (13) 
In equation (12), the left-hand side is the exogenous supply of young H-workers which must 
equal the demand for young H-workers by domestic and foreign firms (the right-hand side). 
The latter is determined by the number of type-A firms, ݊ௗ௔ ൅ ݊௙௔, times the employment of 
young H-workers in a representative firm, which is given by their output divided by their 
productivity, ܺܪଵ௔/ݎ݄ଵ௔. 
Second, S-workers can join both types of firms initially. In equilibrium, workers must 
be indifferent between joining type-A and type-B firms. Hence, the net present value of 
earnings over two periods from joining a type-A firm should equal the two-period return from 
joining a type-B firm: 
ݓݏଵ௔ ൅ ߜݓݏଶ௔ ൒ 1 ൅ ߜ																																								ݓݏଵ௔    (14) 
where ߜ is the discount rate.  
Finally, the number of inexperienced S-workers in type-A firms should equal the 
number of experienced S-workers employed in the second period. This is essentially a 
“steady-state” condition, where the second-period wage is the complementary variable: 
  ൫݊ௗ௔ ൅ ݊௙௔൯ܺ ଵܵ௔/ݎݏଵ௔ ൒ ൫݊ௗ௔ ൅ ݊௙௔൯ܺܵଶ௔/ݎݏଶ௔																		ݓݏଶ௔   (15) 
Model solution 
Our model given by (2)-(15) thus constitutes fourteen non-linear inequalities in fourteen non-
negative variables. In the case where we have an interior solution for all variables (all 
equations hold with equality), it is straightforward to solve analytically for the equilibrium 
prices and wages. From (6), our choice of ݎݏ௕ ൌ ݓݏ௕ ൌ 1	 gives us:  
݌௕ ൌ ߪ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ⁄            (16) 
and from (9), the equilibrium output of a representative type-B firm is then:  
ܺ௕ ൌ ሺߪ െ 1ሻܨܥ௕         (17) 
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 Wages for S-workers in type-A firms can then be found from (2), (3), and (14). From 
(2) and (3), we get: 
௪௦భೌ
௪௦మೌ ൌ
௥௦భೌ
௥௦మೌ ,           (18) 
and using these in (14) gives us: 
ݓݏଵ௔ ൌ ሺଵାఋሻ௥௦భೌሺ௥௦భೌ ାఋ௥௦మೌ ሻ ൌ ߚݎݏଵ
௔ ൑ 1,					ݓݏଶ௔ ൌ ሺଵାఋሻ௥௦మೌሺ௥௦భೌ ାఋ௥௦మೌ ሻ ൌ ߚݎݏଶ
௔ ൒ 1  (19) 
where: ߚ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߜሻ/ሺݎݏଵ௔ ൅ ߜݎݏଶ௔ሻ ൑ 1 and ݎݏଶ௔ ൒ 1/ߚ ൒ ݎݏଵ௔ ൒ 1. Given that we know ݓݏଵ௔ 
from (19), we can solve for ݌௔ from (2): 
݌௔ ൌ ఙఙିଵ ∙
ሺଵାఋሻ
ሺ௥௦భೌ ାఋ௥௦మೌ ሻ ൌ
ఙ
ఙିଵ ߚ ൑ ݌௕      (20) 
Finally, we can use (4) and (5) along with (20) to solve for the wages of H-workers:  
ݓ݄ଵ௔ ൌ ߚݎ݄ଵ௔ ൒ ݓݏଵ௔,					ݓ݄ଶ௔ ൌ ߚݎ݄ଶ௔ ൒ ݓݏଶ௔	     (21) 
 Furthermore, equilibrium output of a type-A firm as well as the equilibrium number of 
domestic and foreign type-A firms and domestic type-B firms can then be found from (7)-(11)  
using the expressions for ݌௔, ݌௕ and ܺ௔ derived above.5 In equilibrium, the profits of all type-
B firms as well as the marginal type-A firms are pushed down to zero, while the average type-
A firm earns a positive profit.6 In the equilibrium of the basic model, the average foreign firm 
is different from the average domestic firm because all foreign firms are type-A firms, while 
domestic firms are a mix of type-A and type-B firms. 
The pure HW case arises when ݎ݄ଶ௔ ൌ ݎ݄ଵ௔ ൐ ݎݏଶ௔ ൌ ݎݏଵ௔ ൒ ݎݏ௕ ൌ 1. In this case, there 
is no learning, but S- and H-workers differ in their initial productivity when working with the 
type-A technology. It follows from (19) that ݓݏଵ௔ ൌ ݓݏଶ௔ ൌ ݓݏ௕ ൌ 1, and from (21) that 
ݓ݄ଵ௔ ൌ ݓ݄ଶ௔ ൐ 1. Hence, S-workers are paid the same wage in both periods in both types of 
																																																								
5 A complete solution of the model as well as numerical examples are available from the authors upon request.   
6 Under the alternative interpretation that all firms have identical fixed costs of using the type-A technology, the 
equilibrium profits of all type-A firms are pushed down to zero. 
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firms, while H-workers receive a higher (but still constant) wage in type-A firms only, which 
results in higher average wages in foreign firms than in domestic firms. 
The pure HL case arises when ݎ݄ଶ௔ ൌ ݎݏଶ௔ ൐ ݎ݄ଵ௔ ൌ ݎݏଵ௔ ൒ ݎݏ௕ ൌ 1  or when ݎݏଶ௔ ൐
ݎݏଵ௔ ൒ ݎݏ௕ ൌ 1 and the supply of H-workers is zero. In this case, all workers are identical ex-
ante, and they all learn when employed by a type-A firm. It follows from (19) and (21) that 
ݓݏଵ௔ ൌ ݓ݄ଵ௔ ൏ 1 and ݓݏଶ௔ ൌ ݓ݄ଶ௔ ൐ 1.  Workers joining type-A firms receive higher second-
period wages, but then have to accept a lower wage in the first period. However, due to 
discounting, the average wage in a type-A firm still exceeds the wage in a type-B firm, 
௪௦భೌ ା௪௦మೌ
ଶ ൐ 1.	Hence, the HL theory predicts both a wage premium and higher wage growth in 
foreign firms. 
A mix between the two cases is possible when ݎݏଶ௔ ൐ ݎݏଵ௔ ൒ ݎݏ௕ ൌ 1, ݎ݄ଶ௔ ൒ ݎݏଶ௔, and 
ݎ݄ଵ௔ ൐ ݎݏଵ௔. S-workers (and possibly also H-workers) learn when employed by type-A firms, 
but S-workers remain less productive than H-workers when working with the type-A 
technology. In this case, S-workers employed by type-A firms earn less in period 1 and more 
in period 2 than S-workers employed by type-B firms, while H-workers – who are only 
employed in type-A firms – might earn more in both periods.  
Except in the pure HW case with ݎݏଵ௔ ൌ ݎݏଶ௔ ൌ 1, type-B firms charge a higher price 
and are smaller in terms of output, although not necessarily in terms of employees, as the 
average employee in a type-B firm is less productive than the average employee in a type-A 
firm. This highlights the potentially close connection between the wage premium in foreign 
firms and the wage premium in large firms. We return to this issue below. 
Extensions 
In this section, we will discuss a couple of extensions of the basic set-up. To save space, 
we do not formally present the extended versions but focus on the intuition. 
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First, the model can be extended to nest the HF theory. The case where the wage 
premium represents a compensating differential could be thought of as a situation in which 
ݎ݄ଶ௔ ൌ ݎ݄ଵ௔ ൌ ݎݏଶ௔ ൌ ݎݏଵ௔ ൌ ݎݏ௕, i.e., where all workers are equally productive in both types 
of firms, but where the employment in a type-A firm is associated with a disutility for the 
worker. In a competitive labor market, the wage premium in type-A firms would then reflect 
exactly this disutility. This would also reduce the profit earned by, and hence the entry of, 
type-A firms, cf. (7)-(8). 
The rent-sharing case, on the other hand, departs from the maintained assumption of a 
competitive labor market in our basic model. Still, the situation could be thought of as one in 
which there are no differences between workers, ݎ݄ଶ௔ ൌ ݎ݄ଵ௔ ൌ ݎݏଶ௔ ൌ ݎݏଵ௔ ൒ ݎݏ௕, but where 
workers are (randomly) assigned to type-A and type-B firms. If workers for some reason 
(efficiency wages or bargaining) get a share of the firm’s profit, those assigned to type-A 
firms would earn a rent relative to other workers. 
Second, an implication of the basic model in the case of learning is that workers joining 
a type-A firm would have to take a wage cut in the first period compared to workers joining a 
type-B firm. In the presence of minimum wages such a wage cut may not be feasible, forcing 
type-A firms to pay their workers higher wages in the first period. This is related to the 
assumption in Fosfuri et al. (2001) where firms are required to pay at least the subsistence 
wage in the first period. The second-period wage would be unaffected, as skills are perfectly 
transferable within firm types. As a consequence, the average wage in type-A firms would go 
up and workers joining type-A firms would now earn a rent relative to workers joining type-B 
firms.7 Profits of type-A firms would again be reduced, causing less entry. 
																																																								
7 Alternatively, a progressive income tax would work somewhat like a minimum wage by making experienced 
H-workers more expensive for the firms. We have worked out this extension formally, but have not included it 
due to space limitations. 
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Third, in the basic model, we only allowed for switching within firm types after period 
1. We have also analyzed a more complicated version of the model in which workers may 
switch firm types after the first period. Allowing for switching in the pure HW case is 
straightforward, as the wages of S-workers are independent of the firm type, while H-workers 
will never switch. In the pure HL case, all workers are ex-ante identical, but face a steeper 
wage profile in type-A firms. A worker in a type-A firm might thus want to switch after 
period 1 if she can get the same (or a higher) wage in a type-B firm. This may happen even if 
she carries only a part of the acquired productivity to a type-B firm. The reason is that type-B 
firms are smaller and thus have a higher price, ݌௕ ൐ ݌௔ , and a higher marginal revenue 
product for a given productivity level. More formally, let ݎݏ௔௕ denote the productivity of a 
worker switching from a type-A to a type-B firm after one period. This worker will be 
indifferent to switching if: 
݌௔ሺ1 െ 1 ߪ⁄ ሻݎݏଶ௔ ൌ ݌௕ሺ1 െ 1 ߪ⁄ ሻݎݏ௔௕      (22) 
where the left-hand side is the second-period wage if she stays, whereas the right-hand side is 
the wage after switching. It follows that the productivity of a switching worker should be at 
least: 
ݎݏ௔௕ ൌ ௣ೌ௣್ ݎݏଶ௔ ൌ
ሺଵାఋሻ௥௦మೌ
ሺ௥௦భೌ ାఋ௥௦మೌ ሻ 						⇒ 						ݎݏଶ
௔ ൐ ݎݏ௔௕ ൐ ݎݏଵ௔ ൒ 1,  (23) 
to make switching worthwhile. On the other hand, in the two-period formulation, a worker 
from a type-B firm would not switch after one period to a type-A firm when there is no 
learning in type-B firms. The reason is that the switching worker would have to take a wage 
cut to compete with new inexperienced workers in the type-A firm. However, in a multi-
period version of our HL model, switching from type-B to type-A firms would be perfectly 
possible.  
In the HF case with compensating differentials, switching could easily be 
accommodated, as workers are indifferent between working in type-A and type-B firms. If the 
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underlying reason is rent-sharing, switching from type-A to type-B firms will not happen 
voluntarily, while switching in the other direction will be very attractive. Hence, in this case, 
switching would occur only if there was some exogenous separations and reassignments 
between periods.8 
Fourth, foreign and domestic type-A firms act similarly, and hence, conditional on 
type/technology, the model predicts no effects per se of foreign ownership. This seems quite 
reasonable, as it is hard to imagine that foreign firms are inherently different from a similar 
selection of domestic firms (which are likely to be the domestic MNEs). However, in a few 
situations, we could imagine that foreign ownership has an independent effect on wages. Thus, 
according to some HF explanations, domestic and foreign type-A firms could have different 
degrees of rent-sharing (due to different levels of bargaining power) or pay different 
compensating differentials (due to preferences by workers for domestic firms).  
Finally, the basic model revealed a close relationship between size and firm type – 
drawing a link to the firm size-wage literature. Actually, in the basic model, size (as measured 
by output) becomes a perfect predictor for firm type, but other things affecting size (such as 
product-specific fixed costs) were left out of the model. Hence, in a more realistic set-up, we 
cannot expect the one-to-one correspondence between size and firm type to survive.  
Summary of theoretical predictions 
Table 1 summarizes the predictions of the HW, HL, and HF theories, which have been 
explained above. The prediction of a “raw” (unconditional) premium is common to all three 
theories (Hypothesis 1). Note, however, that a “true” wage premium in foreign firms in the 
form of rents to the workers employed can only arise under imperfect labor markets, i.e., 
under the HF theory with rent-sharing or under the extended HL theory with minimum wages. 
																																																								
8 Exogenous dissolution of matches between workers and firms and imperfect re-matching (due to search costs) 
could, of course, also create additional (involuntary) switching between firm types in the HW and HL cases. 
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According to the HW theory, the wage premium reflects differences in ex-ante skills, while 
the basic HL theory says that it reflects differences in ex-post skills. 
The remaining predictions (Hypotheses 2-7) differ across the three theories and hence, 
in principle, allow us to discriminate empirically between them. In the remainder of this paper, 
we investigate the hypotheses from Table 1 on a huge matched employer-employee data set 
from Denmark to see if we can find evidence of the relative importance of the different 
theories.    
Table 1: Theoretical predictions  
 HW HL HF 
Hypothesis 1: Wage premium (= higher average wage) in foreign 
firms 
Yes Yes Yes 
Hypothesis 2: Wage premium in foreign firms conditional on ex-
ante worker skills 
No Yes Yes 
Hypothesis 3: Wage growth higher in foreign firms – also 
conditional on ex-ante worker skills 
No Yes No 
Hypothesis 4: Past experience from foreign firms raises current 
wages – also conditional on ex-ante worker skills 
No Yes No 
Hypothesis 5: Starting wages are different in foreign firms Yes, 
higher 
Maybe Yes, 
higher 
Hypothesis 6: Starting wages are different in foreign firms 
conditional on ex-ante worker skills 
No Yes, 
lower 
Yes, 
higher 
Hypothesis 7: Effects disappear (are reduced) when conditioning 
on firm type (or other firm characteristics correlated with type) 
Yes Yes Maybe
 
III. Data 
 The data come from the Integrated Data Base of Labor Market Research (IDA), which 
contains register based annual data since 1980 on all individuals with Danish residence. IDA 
provides detailed information on individual background variables such as education and 
family characteristics as well as labor market performance, including occupations and income. 
All workers are linked to establishments that from 1995 and onwards can be linked to 
firm-level information, which, e.g., allows us to identify all employees in foreign-owned 
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firms in Denmark. Information about foreign ownership is currently available only for the 
years 2002-2007.9  As a consequence, in the regressions we rely on a panel for the years 
2002-2007, while we use the historical information to construct, e.g., measures of total labor 
market experience of an individual. 
Note that information about occupation in a given year is based on the individual’s 
occupation in the last week of November. Hence, we cannot observe worker flows within a 
given year. In the regressions to follow, we restrict our attention to workers aged 20-65 years 
in the non-primary private sector, who entered the labor market in 1981 or later.  
Table 2 presents the number of firms as well as the total employment of foreign-owned 
and domestically owned firms in Denmark in the years 2002 and 2007. While the total stock 
of firms averaged approximately 275,000 in 2002 and 305,000 in 2007, only slightly more 
than 1% of these were foreign-owned. However, as also shown in the table, the foreign firms 
were considerably larger on average, which implies that they accounted for 13-16% of total 
employment. This relationship between size and ownership is fully consistent with the model 
of the previous section.  
[insert Table 2 around here] 
 In Table 3, we provide a first check on the relationship between ownership, wage levels, 
and wage growth. The table contains the average wages and average wage growth rates for 
employees in foreign-owned and domestically owned firms, respectively. The income 
measure used is an hourly (nominal) wage reported by Statistics Denmark. As predicted by all 
three versions of our model, the average wages reveal a significant wage gap between 
domestically owned and foreign-owned firms (more than 15% in 2002 and 13% in 2007). 
																																																								
9 A firm is classified as foreign-owned if foreigners ultimately own more than 50% of the firm. Danish-owned 
MNEs cannot be identified in the data and are hence included among the domestic firms. 
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Consistent with the HL theory, the table also shows that average wage growth has been higher 
in foreign firms by 0.5 percentage points.  
[insert Table 3 around here] 
 The data also reveal that a considerable amount of individuals flow between foreign- 
and domestically owned firms each year. Around 15-20% of those employed in a foreign-
owned firm in a given year move to another firm the following year. Approximately half of 
these end up in a domestically owned firm. 
 Table 4 contains summary statistics (and definitions) of the main variables used in the 
regressions in the following section. In addition to the variables listed, we use dummy 
variables for industries, areas (Copenhagen, urban, and rural), years, and – in some of the 
regressions – different size-classes of firms.  
[insert Table 4 around here] 
IV. Empirical Results 
In this section, we investigate more formally the hypotheses from Table 1. First, we test 
the existence of a wage premium in foreign firms, how much of it that can be explained by 
ex-ante worker characteristics, and whether it is reduced by conditioning on other observable 
firm characteristics. This relates to Hypotheses 1, 2, and 7. Second, we look for more specific 
evidence of the HL and HF theories by testing whether wage growth is higher in foreign firms 
(Hypothesis 3), whether past experience matters (Hypothesis 4), and whether starting wages 
are different in foreign firms (Hypotheses 5 and 6).  
All three theories predict an unconditional wage premium in foreign firms compared to 
domestic firms. A simple way of testing this is by regressing (the log of) individual wages on 
a dummy for foreign ownership of the firm. This is done in the first column of Table 5. We 
find that the unconditional premium is 8.4%. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. 
[insert Table 5 around here] 
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Note that all regressions include time, area, and industry dummies. Hence, we are ex-
ante eliminating the part of the wage premium that can be ascribed to a different industry 
pattern and location of the foreign-owned firms. In other words, the premium identified in 
column 1 is a within industry-area premium. For comparison, a recent paper by Balsvik 
(2011) focusing on the Norwegian manufacturing sector finds a wage premium of 5.7% in 
foreign firms compared to domestic non-multinational firms when controlling for industry but 
not area. Heyman et al. (2007) find a wage premium of 4.3% in foreign-owned firms in 
Sweden when controlling for industry, while Martins (2004) finds a premium of close to 30% 
in Portugal when controlling neither for industry nor for area. The unconditional wage 
premium in Table 3, where we did not control for industry and area, was 15.1% in 2002 and 
13.2% in 2007. 
According to the HW version of our theory model, the higher average wage in foreign 
firms can be fully explained by ex-ante differences in worker skills. Hence, the wage 
premium should disappear once we control for these. One way to do this is by including a 
range of observable worker characteristics intended to capture ex-ante skills in the regression. 
This is done in column 2 where we control for gender, education, age (second-order 
polynomial), experience (fourth-order polynomial10), and tenure (second-order polynomial). 
As predicted by the HW theory, the premium drops, but only by 1.3 percentage points to 
7.1%.11  
In column 3, we also control for (the log of) establishment size. As predicted by 
hypothesis 7, this further reduces (but does not eliminate) the premium. The foreign-firm 
																																																								
10  The fourth-order polynomial for experience is chosen to avoid the symmetry properties imposed by a 
quadratic specification. In this way, it can better capture the strength of the wage growth in the first years of the 
workers’ careers. We thank one of the referees for pointing this out. 
11 The estimated effects of age, experience, and tenure are generally as expected. Wages increase with age and 
experience, especially early in the career, while tenure is found to have a more limited but also declining effect. 
	 22
wage premium is still estimated at 5.7% and highly significant. Note that for comparison the 
gender wage gap is estimated to be around 20%, and that an establishment with 100 
employees is found to pay wages that are approximately 4.8% higher than in an establishment 
with 10 employees.12 
Controlling for observable worker characteristics may not completely eliminate 
differences in ex-ante worker skills, as some of these skills may be unobservable. Adding 
worker fixed effects (FE) as in columns 4-6 removes the effects of all time-invariant 
observable and unobservable worker characteristics. This reduces the raw premium to 2.5% 
(column 4). Further adding the observable time-variant individual characteristics (age, 
experience, and tenure) reduces the foreign-firm wage premium to 2.3% (column 5).  
Considering how the wage premium changes as we control for time-variant and time-
invariant worker characteristics gives us an estimate of the relative importance of the HW 
theory in explaining the observed wage premium. Specifically, comparing the wage premium 
in column 1 with that in column 5 provides an estimate of the upper bound for the importance 
of the HW theory in explaining the premium. It follows that the HW theory can explain up to 
75% of the observed wage premium in foreign vs. domestic firms. The estimate is an upper 
bound, as some of the decrease in the estimated coefficient between columns 1 and 5 could 
reflect firm differences picked up by worker fixed effects if individuals do not move (too 
much) between firms. In any case, it still leaves a significant share (at least 25%) of the 
premium to be explained by the HL and HF theories. Again, controlling for establishment size 
(column 6) reduces the estimated premium to 1.9% consistent with Hypothesis 7. 
While a number of other studies find that the foreign wage premium is reduced when 
controlling for observable worker characteristics (see, e.g., Aitken et al., 1996, Doms and 
																																																								
12 The estimated establishment-size wage premium can be calculated as ሺݏ݅ݖ݁ଵ ݏ݅ݖ݁ଶ⁄ ሻ଴.଴ଶ଴ହ െ 1 where 0.0205 is 
the estimated elasticity from column 3. 
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Jensen, 1998, Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004, and Feliciano and Lipsey, 2006), we are not aware 
of any other study that analyses how much of the premium can actually be explained by the 
HW theory, i.e., by observable as well as unobservable worker characteristics. Recent studies 
by Balsvik (2011) and Martins and Esteves (2008), Heyman et al. (2007), and Andrews et al. 
(2009) include both worker and firm fixed effects in their regressions, but they do not attempt 
to assess how much of the premium can be explained by differences in ex-ante worker skills. 
Our approach is more in line with that of Schank et al. (2007) who use German linked 
employer-employee data to analyze how much the wage premium in exporting firms is 
reduced when controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics of the workers.13 
The remaining wage premium in column 5 is an estimate of the importance of the HL 
and HF theories in generating a wage premium, but as we shall argue this may not fully 
reflect the economic importance of these theories for the wage determination more generally 
in foreign firms. Thus, with worker fixed effects included, identification of the coefficient of 
the foreign dummy in column 5 comes from (a) worker mobility (workers switching between 
firms of different status); and (b) change of firm status (through foreign take-overs or 
domestic buy-backs). 
With respect to (a), according to our theory model, worker mobility will only identify a 
positive wage premium if switching between domestic type-B and foreign type-A firms is 
observed, while switches between domestic and foreign type-A firms will not be associated 
with a wage change and hence will serve to drag the estimate towards zero. In the HF case 
with rent-sharing, switches between firm types require some exogenous (and involuntary) 
reassignment of workers to firms. In the HL case, voluntary switching from a domestic type-
B to a foreign type-A firm is possible and should eventually result in a higher wage (although 
																																																								
13 In the labor-market literature, the importance of worker heterogeneity for the large-firm premium has been 
analyzed by, e.g., Abowd et al. (1999). 
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the higher average wage may not have time to manifest itself in a short panel), while the 
effect of switching from a foreign type-A to a domestic type-B firm should not be negative if 
switching is voluntary, as workers only switch if they maintain their wage level. In sum, even 
if the HL and HF theories are correct, the wage premium identified from worker mobility 
between foreign and domestic firms is watered down by switches within type-A firms and by 
switches from type-A to type-B firms in the HL case.14 
With respect to (b), our theory model does not explicitly allow for any changes of 
ownership. However, two real-life situations can be imagined and could possibly be 
incorporated into our model. First, a change of firm status could represent a real change of 
firm type (from a type-B to a type-A firm or the other way around) if the new owners acquire 
the assets but use their own technology, organization, etc. In this case, we would expect an 
effect on wages according to all three theories. Second, the change of firm status could merely 
reflect a simple change of ownership with no consequences for the firm type. In this case, we 
would expect to find no effect on wages. If the second type of ownership change is common 
in the data, this will again drag the estimated premium towards zero. 
To eliminate the latter effect, the foreign-firm dummy can be constructed such that it 
takes the value one for all observations in a given job spell if the firm is foreign-owned in at 
least one of the years within the spell. In this way, we eliminate any time-series variation in 
the foreign dummy within job spells, and its coefficient is thus identified exclusively from 
																																																								
14 Furthermore, even under the pure HW version of the model, we may find an effect of switching on individual 
wages if H-workers (involuntarily) switch from type-A to type-B firms, as type-B firms are not able to fully 
exploit the skills of the worker. However, according to our model, observing such a switch requires some sort of 
market disequilibrium, as other type-A firms should be interested in hiring the worker. Alternatively, introducing 
a match-specific component of worker productivity could result in an effect of (involuntary) switching in the 
HW case. 
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individuals switching firms.15 This definition of the foreign-firm dummy can also be seen as 
an attempt to let it capture the underlying firm type rather than the nationality of ownership. 
Using this approach (columns 7 and 8 in Table 5), we find that the unconditional premium of 
8.2% (column 7) is only reduced to 3.7% (column 8) when we control for observable and 
unobservable worker characteristics.16 Hence, as expected, a large premium remains to be 
explained by the HL and HF theories.  
In sum, we find significant evidence of a wage premium in foreign firms consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, which is common to all three theories. Furthermore, up to 75% of the 
unconditional wage premium can be explained by ex-ante worker characteristics pointing to 
an important role for the HW theory.17 However, as a significant part of the premium remains, 
this points to an important role of the HF and/or HL theories as well. We also argued that the 
estimated wage premium may not fully reflect the relevance of these theories. Hence, in the 
remainder of this section we will look for more specific evidence of these. 
																																																								
15 As pointed out by one referee, using this approach may both remove and magnify measurement error if (some) 
firms erroneously change status from one year to another.  
16 We also tried to let the foreign dummy take the value one only if the firm was foreign-owned in all years in a 
job spell. In this case, the unconditional premium is reduced from 8.3% to 3.6% by the inclusion of observable 
and unobservable worker characteristics. Alternatively, one could exclude from the sample all job-spells where 
the foreign dummy is not stable. However, this would induce serious sample-selection issues.  
17 We also ran regressions separately for men and women. For men, the unconditional premium is reduced from 
10.1% to 2.5% when we include observable and unobservable worker characteristics. For women, the 
corresponding numbers are 5.8% and 1.7%, respectively. We did not include firm fixed effects in any of the 
regressions. With firm fixed effects, identification comes exclusively from change of firm status from foreign to 
domestic or the other way around, and this does not help us to distinguish between the three explanations of the 
wage premium. 
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To test Hypothesis 3, Table 6 regresses annual wage growth within a job spell (i.e., it is 
required that the worker is in the same establishment in two subsequent years) on the same set 
of explanatory variables as used in Table 5. 
[insert Table 6 around here] 
Column 1 regresses annual wage growth on our foreign-firm dummy as well as on the 
set of industry, area, and time dummies used in Table 5. The estimated coefficient is 
significant and predicts a wage-growth rate which is 0.21 percentage points higher in foreign 
firms. With an annual wage growth rate of, say, 2% this amounts to 10% higher wage growth 
in foreign firms. Controlling for observable worker characteristics (column 2) actually 
increases the estimated coefficient slightly, and it remains significant. Furthermore, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 7, controlling for establishment size (column 3) reduces the 
estimated effect.  
It could be argued that the estimated effect is due to an omitted variable bias, as foreign 
firms select workers that have more potential for wage growth. Our model in section II, did 
not allow for such differences between individuals, but one could think of this as an extended 
version of Yeaple’s heterogeneous-worker model, and a similar feature was actually present 
in Rosen’s (1972) original model. However, wage growth should still be higher in foreign 
firms when controlling for worker unobservables if the HL theory is correct (Hypothesis 3). 
One way to check this is by including individual fixed effects in the regressions. This is done 
in columns 4-6. This reduces the estimated coefficient slightly, and it becomes insignificant 
when individual controls are added (column 5). Including establishment size (column 6) 
further reduces the size (and significance) of the estimate. Instead, establishment size 
becomes significant, which is consistent with hypothesis 7, as size may be a better proxy for 
the underlying firm type. This can be further investigated by using the alternative definition of 
the foreign-firm dummy from above where it takes the value one if the firm is foreign-owned 
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for at least one year of a job spell. This increases the level and significance of the estimated 
coefficient considerably (column 7), which is consistent with this alternative definition of the 
foreign dummy better capturing the underlying firm type.18, 19  
While a number of studies have previously dealt with the relationship between 
ownership (or size) and wage levels, only a few have considered the effects on wage growth. 
In a somewhat different context, Møen (2005) finds higher wage growth in R&D intensive 
firms. In a cross-sectional setting, Pearce (1990) has also previously found higher wage 
growth in large firms, whereas Barron et al. (1987) found a negative relationship between size 
and wage growth. In more recent studies, Görg et al. (2007) find evidence that wage growth is 
higher in foreign firms in Ghana, but only for workers receiving on-the-job training, while 
Martins (2011) finds higher wage growth for workers who move from domestic to foreign 
firms compared to those who stay.  
To test the importance of past experience, Table 7 extends the regressions from Table 5 
with information about past experience from foreign firms. Column 1 more or less reproduces 
column 3 of Table 5, but includes nine size dummies as controls (constructed from the 
observed deciles in the distribution of establishment size) instead of the log of establishment 
size. This is a more flexible specification of the wage-size relationship, but the coefficient of 
																																																								
18 If we instead let the foreign dummy take the value one only if the firm is foreign owned during all years of a 
job spell, results become very similar to the main specification in Table 6. We also tried to run regressions 
separately for men and women, but did not find any noteworthy differences between the genders, although 
results for men in general tend to be more significant. 
19 Note that the estimated coefficient of the log of establishment size increases significantly (by more than 50%) 
when adding individual fixed effects. This is somewhat surprising and seems to go against Rosen’s (1972) 
original idea that workers with high learning capacity will self-select into jobs where the potential for learning is 
high. However, it could reflect that large establishments employ more blue-collar workers or less-skilled workers 
with less potential for wage growth and that this is not fully captured by the observable characteristics in the 
OLS regressions.  
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the foreign dummy is almost unaffected by this. Hence, while the inclusion of controls for 
establishment size reduces the foreign-firm wage premium (cf. Table 5) as predicted by all 
three theories (Hypothesis 7), it cannot eliminate the premium. 
[insert Table 7 around here] 
 Column 2 includes a variable measuring the total accumulated experience from foreign 
firms called “Foreign-Firm Experience”, which is the number of years employed in a foreign 
firm over the entire career of the worker. Note, however, that our information only goes back 
to 2002. Hence, the experience measure from foreign firms is a truncated measure. The 
coefficient of this variable will capture the additional effect of experience since 2002 from 
(current as well as previous) employments in foreign firms. Furthermore, to distinguish 
between effects from current and previous employments in foreign firms, we also include the 
cross-product between “Foreign” and “Tenure”. The coefficient of this latter variable will 
indicate whether foreign-firm experience obtained in the current employment relationship has 
a different effect than foreign-firm experience obtained in previous employments. 
It turns out that experience in general pays off: initially around 5% per year, but 
dropping to less than 1% after 10 years.20 These estimates are similar to those from Table 5. 
More interestingly, “Foreign-Firm Experience” adds another 0.9% indicating that experience 
from foreign firms is indeed more valuable than experience from domestic establishments. 
Furthermore, as the coefficients of “Foreign * Tenure” and “Foreign * Tenure2” are slightly 
negative and insignificant, foreign-firm experience acquired in previous employments is (at 
																																																								
20 Average experience in the data set is close to 15 years, cf. Table 4. 
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least) as important as foreign-firm experience acquired in the current employment. This is 
strongly supportive of the idea of learning and transferable skills as stated in Hypothesis 4.21 
As the measure of total foreign-firm experience is truncated in 2002, we also construct a 
measure of total large-establishment experience as an alternative proxy for experience from 
type-A firms. This measure is constructed as the total accumulated experience since 1981 
from establishments with a size exceeding the median size (= 50 employees) for workers in 
the data set. In column 3, we include this variable together with interaction terms between a 
“Large” establishment dummy (constructed in a similar way) and “Tenure” and “Experience”, 
respectively.  
As can be seen from column 3, this only marginally affects the coefficient estimates 
from column 2. On top of that, we find that total experience from large establishments also 
influences wages positively. Again, it is the total experience that matters. There is no extra 
positive effect if the experience is from the current employment. Actually, the coefficient of 
“Large * Tenure” is slightly negative. 
Together, these results are supportive of the HL theory. However, we could get positive 
coefficient estimates to “Foreign-Firm Experience” even in the absence of learning if total 
experience from foreign (or large) firms is correlated with ex-ante worker quality. To 
eliminate this possibility, we can control for worker fixed effects. This is done in columns 4-6 
of Table 7. As can be seen, this does not significantly alter the conclusions. The coefficient 
estimates to “Foreign-Firm Experience” actually increase somewhat (although the second-
order terms also become more negative) and significant, whereas the effect of large-
establishment experience decreases, but remains significantly positive. Hence, the effects of 
																																																								
21 Note also that general experience does not seem to be valued more in foreign firms, as the coefficients of 
“Foreign * Experience” and “Foreign * Experience2” jointly result in a tiny negative effect, which seems to be 
counteracted by a higher coefficient of the foreign dummy in column 2. 
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previously acquired skills at foreign or large establishments do not seem to be due to ex-ante 
“better” workers having more experience from foreign and large establishments.22 
Note, however, that with worker fixed effects, the coefficients of the foreign-firm 
experience variables are identified from within changes, i.e., from workers switching or from 
change of ownership. The latter can again be eliminated by using the alternative definition of 
the foreign dummy, where it takes the value one if the firm is foreign-owned for at least one 
year of a job spell. This increases the size and significance of the coefficient of “Foreign-Firm 
experience” both in OLS and FE (columns 7 and 8).23 
Existing studies by Görg and Strobl (2005) and Balsvik (2011) also find evidence that 
previous experience from multinationals pays off in subsequent employment. Compared to 
these studies, we explicitly test for the importance of the amount of previous experience, and 
we control for ex-ante unobserved skills using fixed effects. One problem is that with worker 
fixed effects and the alternative definition of the “Foreign” dummy, the identification of the 
coefficient of “Foreign-Firm Experience” exclusively stems from worker switching. This 
introduces a selection issue given the relatively short nature of the panel.  Hence, the 
estimates of the coefficients should be interpreted with some caution. 
Another hypothesis specific to the HL theory is that starting wages should be lower in 
foreign firms – at least when conditioning on ex-ante worker skills (Hypothesis 6). This can 
be tested indirectly by looking at the estimated coefficient of the foreign dummy in columns 2 
and 3 of Table 7. When interactions between the foreign dummy and both experience and 
tenure are included, this coefficient should reflect the effect of foreign ownership on the 
																																																								
22 We also ran the regressions separately for men and women. The coefficient to “Foreign-Firm Experience” was 
only significantly positive for females in OLS, while the FE estimates were significantly positive for both sexes. 
The coefficients to “Large-Establishment Experience” were significantly positive for both sexes in OLS and FE. 
23 Very similar results are obtained if we instead let the foreign dummy take the value one only if the firm is 
foreign-owned during all years of a job spell. 
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initial wage. As the coefficient is positive, it does not support the HL theory. Instead, a 
positive effect is consistent with both the HF and the HW theories (cf. Hypothesis 5). 
However, according to the HW theory, the positive effect should disappear once we control 
for ex-ante worker skills as in columns 5 and 6 (cf. Hypothesis 6). In this case, the coefficient 
is identified from comparing (starting wages of) different job spells by the same worker 
(controlling for the amount of total experience). But although the estimated coefficient drops, 
the fact that it is still positive lends strong support to the HF theory. 
In sum, the evidence in relation to Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 provides considerable support 
for the HL theory, as wage growth is higher in foreign firms and as skills acquired in these 
firms are transferable to subsequent employments. Furthermore, the fact that starting wages 
remain higher in foreign firms even after controlling for worker fixed effects lends support to 
the HF theory. 
V. Conclusion 
Three general theories of the different wage-setting practices in foreign-owned firms 
can be identified from the existing literature: A heterogeneous-workers (HW) theory, a 
heterogeneous-learning (HL) theory, and a heterogeneous-firms (HF) theory. In this paper, we 
have set up a model that explicitly encompasses the first two of these and which can also be 
used to analyze the implications of the third. This unifying framework allowed us to derive 
and compare the predictions of all three theories – highlighting important similarities as well 
as differences. 
Testing the implications on Danish matched employer-employee data revealed 
significant support for all three theories. The HW theory, which says that foreign firms simply 
employ ex-ante better workers, was thus capable of explaining up to 75% of the observed 
wage premium, while the evidence of higher wage growth in foreign firms and the importance 
of past foreign-firm and large-firm experience supports the HL theory. Finally, the higher 
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starting wages in foreign firms (even when controlling for worker fixed effects) bear evidence 
of the HF theory. 
All three theories – and the empirical evidence – suggest a productivity advantage of 
foreign firms. But the host-country implications differ between the theories. Both in the HW 
and the HL cases foreign firms may help to realize the production potential of domestic 
workers if domestic type-A firms are in limited supply. In the HF case, on the other hand, 
benefits for domestic workers arise if foreign firms share some of their rents with them.  
The HL theory probably offers the most interesting perspectives for the host countries. 
Throughout the paper, we have referred to the improvement in productivity as “learning”, but 
as mentioned in the introduction, this also covers explicit training, learning-by-doing, or the 
discovery of technology, “tricks”, or “recipes” that can be used in competing firms. Our 
theory model provides a theoretical foundation for the existence of such productivity transfers. 
In our model, however, these were fully internalized by the agents, and as such did not 
provide any extra gains for the host country. But positive externalities in the form of 
spillovers to domestic forms through worker mobility can, of course, be conceived. Imperfect 
labor markets, in the form of, e.g., non-competitive wage setting, may prevent both domestic 
workers and subsequent domestic employers from paying for the full value of the workers’ 
experience. Balsvik (2011) thus finds that the productivity effects in the domestic firms seem 
to exceed the higher wages paid to workers with experience from multinationals. In that case, 
encouraging more foreign direct investment may have large potential benefits for the host 
country. 
Before jumping to policy conclusions, three things should be emphasized. First, we 
have not investigated the existence of externalities empirically in this paper. Second, we have 
focused only on the benefits that arise directly through domestic workers. As argued by, e.g., 
Lipsey (2004), other types of benefits and spillover channels have been suggested in the 
	 33
literature, including firm-to-market and firm-to-firm spillovers. Third, a thorough analysis of 
the host-country benefits requires a general-equilibrium set-up. Thus, according to all three 
theories, foreign firms also reduce the profits of domestic firms and affect consumers through 
prices and product varieties. Further research is required to guide policy in this area.  
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Table 2: Firm Types and Employment
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
0-49 268,398          2,301             297,996          2,672          
50-499 2,705              665                3,449              792             
500+ 176                 71                  305                 105             
Total 271,279          3,037             301,750          3,569          
0-49 593,837          26,335           700,958          29,353        
50-499 309,586          102,668         396,681          119,686      
500+ 289,633          100,245         898,795          140,621      
Total 1,193,056       229,248         1,996,434       289,660      
Table 3: Firm Types, Average Wages and Wage Growth
2002 2007
Domestic 193.03 222.58
Foreign 222.26 252.07
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Mean St.dev
Foreign 0.209 0.406
Age 36.088 8.395
Experiencea 14.828 7.970
Tenurea 5.918 5.024
Male 0.644 0.479
Years of educationa 12.453 2.446
Establishment sizea 267.284 586.113
Number of observations 3,163,381     
Note: The table includes firms in the private sector and workers in full-time equivalents. The division of firms into 
size classes is based on the average number of employees over  the year.
Absolute numbers
2002 2007
Firm Size
(# employees) # Firms
Employment
Note: The table includes full-time workers in the non-primary private sector, aged 20-65 years. Average wages are 
hourly wages in DKK. Average annual wage growth is based on workers that stay in the same job in two 
consecutive years.
Average annual wage growth
2002-7
3.5%
4.0%
Note: The sample is based on all workers in the non-primary private sector, aged 20-65 years, who entered the 
labor market in 1981 or later. Observations are at the worker-year level, and observations with missing values for 
some of the variables above or with a low quality of the hourly-wage variable according to Statistics Denmark have 
been excluded. Summary statistics have been computed as simple averages across all observations. 
a Experience  is a continuous measure (in years of full-time work) of actual labor market experience based on the 
number of days in employment over the worker's career. Tenure  is the number of years employed at the current 
establishment.  Years of education  is years of completed education. Establishment size  is the number of employees 
in the last week of November at the establishment where the worker is employed.
Average wages
Table 5: The Wage Premium in Foreign Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS Indv. FE Indv. FE Indv. FE OLS Indv. FE
Foreign 0.08414 0.07145 0.05744 0.02490 0.02267 0.01943 0.08178 0.03729
(0.00897)** (0.00667)** (0.0065)** (0.0018)** (0.00156)** (0.00149)** (0.00908)** (0.00162)**
Log(establishment size) 0.02048 0.01355
(0.00155)** (0.0006)**
Age 0.03805 0.03722
(0.00134)** (0.00131)**
Age2 -0.00046 -0.00045 -0.00078 -0.00077 -0.00078
(0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00002)** (0.00002)** (0.00002)**
Experience 0.06560 0.06622 0.08987 0.08956 0.08981
(0.00177)** (0.00173)** (0.00219)** (0.00217)** (0.00218)**
Experience2 -0.00445 -0.00446 -0.00739 -0.00739 -0.00738
(0.00017)** (0.00017)** (0.00018)** (0.00018)** (0.00018)**
Experience3 0.00013 0.00013 0.00024 0.00024 0.00024
(0.00001)** (0.000006)** (0.000007)** (0.000007)** (0.000007)**
Experience4 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000003 -0.000003 -0.000003
(0.0000001)** (0.0000001)** (0.0000001)** (0.0000001)** (0.0000001)**
Tenure 0.00801 0.00698 0.00681 0.00631 0.00687
(0.0007)** (0.00068)** (0.00032)** (0.00031)** (0.00031)**
Tenure2 -0.00032 -0.00029 -0.00026 -0.00025 -0.00026
(0.00002)** (0.00002)** (0.00002)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)**
Male 0.1992 0.2011
(0.00388)** (0.00386)**
Years of education 0.05138 0.04994
(0.00067)** (0.00063)**
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     
Number of individuals -                -                877,898        877,898        877,898        877,898        
R-squared 0.16              0.40              0.41              0.27              0.32              0.32              0.16              0.32              0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
Note: Estimations are based on a panel from 2002-2007 of workers in the private non-primary sector of age 20-65 years, who entered the labor market in 1981 or later. See Table 4
and main text for variable definitions. In columns 7 and 8, Foreign is defined such that it takes the value one for all observations in a given job spell if the firm is foreign owned in at
least one of the years within the spell. Note that the coefficient to Age cannot be identified in the fixed-effects regressions as they also include time dummies. The reported R-
squared statistics for the fixed-effects regressions are computed after the removal of the fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * =
significant at 5% level, **= significant at 1% level.
Table 6: Wage Growth in Foreign Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS Indv. FE Indv. FE Indv. FE Indv. FE
Foreign 0.00213 0.00277 0.00213 0.00256 0.00173 0.00143 0.00435
(0.00077)** (0.00069)** (0.00074)** (0.00103)* (0.00107) (0.00108) (0.00097)**
Log(establishment size) 0.00094 0.00164 0.00154
(0.00021)** (0.00035)** (0.00035)**
Age -0.00671 -0.00676
(0.00021)** (0.00021)**
Age2 0.00006 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007
(0.000002)** (0.000002)** (0.000006)** (0.000006)** (0.000006)**
Experience -0.00429 -0.00425 0.01107 0.01104 0.01102
(0.00043)** (0.00043)** (0.00125)** (0.00125)** (0.00125)**
Experience2 0.00021 0.00021 -0.00027 -0.00027 -0.00027
(0.00004)** (0.00004)** (0.00007)** (0.00007)** (0.00007)**
Experience3 -0.000002 -0.000002 0.000015 0.000015 0.000015
(0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000003)** (0.000003)** (0.000003)**
Experience4 -0.00000003 -0.00000003 -0.00000021 -0.00000021 -0.00000021
(0.00000001)* (0.00000001)* (0.00000003)** (0.00000003)** (0.00000003)**
Tenure 0.00168 0.00163 0.00531 0.00526 0.00527
(0.00012)** (0.00013)** (0.00022)** (0.00023)** (0.00023)**
Tenure2 -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00023 -0.00023 -0.00023
(0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)**
Male 0.00187 0.00196
(0.00036)** (0.00035)**
Years of education 0.00101 0.00094
(0.00007)** (0.00007)**
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,704,381 2,704,381       2,704,381       2,704,381 2,704,381       2,704,381       2,704,381       
Number of individuals -            -                 -                 795,020    795,020          795,020          795,020          
R-squared 0.02          0.03                0.03                0.02          0.02                0.02                0.02                0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dependent variable: dlog(hourly wage)
Note: Estimations are based on a panel from 2002-2007 of workers in the private non-primary sector of age 20-65 years, who entered the labor market in 1981 or
later. See Table 4 and main text for variable definitions. In columns 7, Foreign is defined such that it takes the value one for all observations in a given job spell if the
firm is foreign owned in at least one of the years within the spell. Note that the coefficient to Age cannot be identified in the fixed-effects regressions as they also
include time dummies. The reported R-squared statistics for the fixed-effects regressions are computed after the removal of the fixed effects. Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * = significant at 5% level, **= significant at 1% level.
Table 7: Past Experience from Foreign Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS Indv. FE Indv. FE Indv. FE OLS Indv. FE
Foreign 0.05767 0.07909 0.06818 0.01934 0.04834 0.04542 0.07100 0.05365
(0.00647)** (0.01098)** (0.01126)** (0.00147)** (0.00558)** (0.00565)** (0.01128)** (0.00702)**
Age 0.03747 0.03729 0.03568 0.03560
(0.00131)** (0.00131)** (0.00128)** (0.00129)**
Age2 -0.00045 -0.00044 -0.00043 -0.00077 -0.00077 -0.00077 -0.00043 -0.00077
(0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00002)** (0.00002)** (0.00002)** (0.00001)** (0.00002)**
Experience 0.06620 0.06171 0.06213 0.08953 0.08699 0.08740 0.06124 0.08599
(0.00173)** (0.00177)** (0.00172)** (0.00218)** (0.00217)** (0.00212)** (0.0018)** (0.00211)**
Experience2 -0.00447 -0.00410 -0.00415 -0.00739 -0.00710 -0.00709 -0.00407 -0.00695
(0.00017)** (0.00016)** (0.00016)** (0.00018)** (0.00018)** (0.00018)** (0.00017)** (0.00018)**
Experience3 0.00013 0.00012 0.00012 0.00024 0.00023 0.00023 0.00012 0.00022
(0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)**
Experience4 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000003 -0.000003 -0.000003 -0.000001 -0.000002
(0.0000001)** (0.0000001)** (0.0000001)** (0.0000001)** (0.0000001)** (0.0000001)** (0.0000001)** (0.0000001)**
Tenure 0.00701 0.00583 0.00548 0.00635 0.00645 0.00683 0.00533 0.00590
(0.00068)** (0.00065)** (0.00053)** (0.00031)** (0.00036)** (0.0003)** (0.0005)** (0.00031)**
Tenure2 -0.00029 -0.00023 -0.00024 -0.00025 -0.00025 -0.00027 -0.00023 -0.00023
(0.00002)** (0.00002)** (0.00002)** (0.00001)** (0.00002)** (0.00001)** (0.00002)** (0.00002)**
Male 0.20105 0.20095 0.20096 0.20122
(0.00388)** (0.00387)** (0.00388)** (0.00389)**
Years of education 0.05007 0.04989 0.04957 0.04956
(0.00064)** (0.00063)** (0.00063)** (0.00064)**
Foreign-Firm Experience 0.00868 0.00712 0.02271 0.02241 0.00984 0.03475
(0.00349)* (0.00352)* (0.00151)** (0.00151)** (0.00331)** (0.00169)**
Foreign-Firm Experience2 0.00047 0.00056 -0.00286 -0.00282 0.00041 -0.00414
(0.00034) (0.00034) (0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.00035) (0.00021)**
Foreign * Tenure -0.00111 -0.00055 -0.00294 -0.00267 -0.00279 -0.00116
(0.00186) (0.00188) (0.0006)** (0.00062)** (0.00179) (0.00071)
Foreign * Tenure2 -0.00005 -0.00007 0.00013 0.00011 0.00001 0.00008
(0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00003)** (0.00003)** (0.00007) (0.00003)**
Foreign * Experience -0.00207 -0.00113 -0.00209 -0.00184 -0.00111 -0.00264
(0.00118) (0.00123) (0.00059)** (0.00059)** (0.00121) (0.00078)**
Foreign * Experience2 0.00009 0.00007 0.00005 0.00005 0.00006 0.00008
(0.00003)** (0.00003)* (0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00003) (0.00002)**
Large-Establ. Experience 0.00467 0.00107 0.00463 0.00101
(0.00053)** (0.00021)** (0.00052)** (0.00021)**
Large-Establ. Experience2 -0.00011 -0.00004 -0.00011 -0.00004
(0.00002)** (0.00001)** (0.00002)** (0.00001)**
Large * Tenure -0.00183 -0.00105 -0.00172 -0.00118
(0.00065)** (0.0003)** (0.00063)** (0.00031)**
Large * Tenure2 0.00008 0.00005 0.00008 0.00006
(0.00002)** (0.00001)** (0.00002)** (0.00001)**
Large * Experience -0.00248 -0.00117 -0.00252 -0.00111
(0.00046)** (0.00019)** (0.00046)** (0.00019)**
Large * Experience2 0.00003 0.00001 0.00003 0.00001
(0.00001)** (0.000002)** (0.000006)** (0.000002)**
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     3,162,869     
Number of individuals 877,898        877,898        877,898        877,898        
R-squared 0.41              0.41              0.41              0.32              0.32              0.32              0.41              0.32              0.00 0.00
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
Note: Estimations are based on a panel from 2002-2007 of workers in the private non-primary sector of age 20-65 years, who entered the labor market in 1981 or later. See Table 4 and
main text for variable definitions. In columns 7 and 8, Foreign is defined such that it takes the value one for all observations in a given job spell if the firm is foreign owned in at least one of
the years within the spell. Note that the coefficient to Age cannot be identified in the fixed-effects regressions as they also include time dummies. The reported R-squared statistics for the
fixed-effects regressions are computed after the removal of the fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * = significant at 5% level, **= significant at
1% level.
